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CABLE AND OBSCENITY
L. A. Powe, Jr.*
Five years ago FCC Commissioner Nicholas Johnson lamented the "absence of any discussion of standards for the control of 'obscenity' or
'indecent' language over the broadcast media."' His hypothetical about
televising I Am Curious (Yellow) as the nine o'clock movie remains a
hypothetical, although thanks to "judicious editing," the networks have been
willing to run R-rated movies during prime time. Even with this, the
networks have retained their traditional lag behind public attitudes and have
been unwilling to explore the exact frontiers of what can be broadcast
legally. Nor have they approached -the lesser frontier which suddenly appeared when the obscenity pendulum made its sharp swing toward a more
refined definition of obscenity in the Miller Quintet 2 two years ago.
That we know more about the law in the area of obscenity and broadcasting than we did five years ago is due largely to four FM radio stations3 and
two able student law review articles. 4 But that has not been enough. The
basic issues have remained unexplored. The nonadventurous nature of
broadcast licensees has meant that difficult cases in this area have not been
presented to the FCC and the courts. If there were a solid body of law
relating to obscenity and indecency in the broadcast media, it would be
easier to extrapolate the probable results of cable television's efforts to redeem
its promise of abundance for the viewing public. But lacking a welldeveloped body of law after almost fifty years of federal regulation, the
extrapolation is more difficult, and, of necessity, more tentative.
* Professor of Law, University of Texas. B.A., Yale, 1965; J.D., University of
Washington, 1968.
1. Johnson, Book Review, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1456, 1464 (1970).
2. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49 (1973); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973); United States v. 12 200Foot Reels of Super 8 mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973); United States v. Orito, 413 U.S.
139 (1973).
3. WBAI (New York City) in Pacifica Foundation, No. 75-200 (Released Feb. 21,
1975); WGLD (Oak Park, Illinois) in Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., 41 F.C.C.2d 919
(1973); WUHY (Philadelphia) in Eastern Education Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 408 (1970);
KRAB (Seattle) in Jack Straw Memorial Foundation, 21 F.C.C.2d 833 (1970).
4. Note, Morality and the Broadcast Media: A Constitutional Analysis of FCC
Regulatory Standards, 84 HARV. L. REv. 664 (1971); Note, Offensive Speech and the
FCC, 79 YALE L.J. 1343 (1970).
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This article will attempt to predict the law relating to obscenity and
indecency communicated over cable as the medium develops. First, it will
compare the problems of visual and written obscenity, looking briefly at the
attempt to impose different standards for obscenity and indecency. Second,
the article will explore the rationale for regulation of broadcasting and cable
programming and how that rationale is likely to affect decisions relating to
obscenity and indecency in the newer medium.

I.

CURRENT OBSCENITY REGULATION

The Sloan Commission aptly noted that "television of abundance is not
merely an augmented television of scarcity." 5 On this there appears universal agreement. Market forces will be allowed to bring programming aimed at
the tastes of small and select classes of individuals. But whatever may be the
untapped potential of cable to provide diverse programming, the market
mechanism will probably not be allowed to operate with respect to obscene
programming. The FCC, often chastised by congressmen for a less than
vigorous attack on obscenity," has promulgated its own rule prohibiting the
cablecasting of obscenity and indecency 7 and has indicated that it will ask
that the rule be codified in the criminal code." Moreover, despite the fact
that the Cabinet Committee on Cable Communications" "was aware of the
FCC's cable regulation but consciously chose a different policy" 10 with
5.
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TELEVISION OF ABUNDANCE 43 (1971). The Sloan Commission on Cable Communications was established by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation in 1970. Its purpose was to
assess the technological possibilities of cable television.
6. See, e.g., BROADCASTING, Feb. 26, 1973, at 50. Commissioner Johnson has suggested that the FCC would not have acted as it did with respect to obscenity and indecency "absent severe Congressional pressure to do something in this area." Sonderling
Broadcasting Corp., 41 F.C.C.2d 919, 923 (1973) (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting).
7. No cable television system when engaged in origination cablecasting shall
transmit or permit to be transmitted on the origination cablecasting channel or
channels material that is obscene or indecent.
47 C.F.R. § 76.215 (1975).
8. Federal Communications Commission, Report on the Broadcast of Violent,
Indecent and Obscene Material 9, FCC No. 75-202, Feb. 19, 1975.
9. The "Whitehead Committee" was formed at the order of President Nixon in 1971
to develop proposals for a comprehensive national policy on cable communications. The
Committee was chaired by Clay T. Whitehead, Director of the Office of Telecommunications Policy (OTP). Other members included Peter G. Peterson, Secretary of Commerce;
Elliot L. Richardson, Secretary of HEW; George Romney, Secretary of HUD; and
Presidential advisors Leonard Garment, Ikobert H. Finch, and Herbert G. Klein.
10. Memorandum from Henry Goldberg, Office of the General Counsel, Office of
Telecommunications Policy, to William V. Skidmore, Jan. 10, 1975. The memorandum
discussed the various agency comments submitted to OTP with respect to the draft Cable
Communications Act of 1975.
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respect to the degree of cable regulation, it did not differ significantly from
the FCC on the issue of prohibiting obscenity and indecency on cable television. The Committee not only suggested that an individual have legal sanctions available to block offensive materials from being transmitted to him,
but also proposed that all laws affecting obscenity apply fully to cable as
well.' 1
Any analysis of cable and potentially obscene or indecent programming
must therefore begin with an obvious political fact: to the extent thot
governmental action can block the cablecasting of such materials, such action
will be attempted. Thus a necessary starting point is an analysis of what the
government may successfully prohibit. The analysis, if one believes Chief
Justice Burger, has an easy ending. The government may prohibit the
transmission of "hardcore" pornography.
With the June 1973 decisions on obscenity, the Court finally garnered a
five-man majority for a refined test of obscenity. It had been a long time
coming. While I have serious doubts that the new test-that the work, taken
as a whole, must appeal to the prurient interest in sex, portray sexual
conduct in a patently offensive way, and, taken as a whole, lack serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value 12-will prove to be a magic
genie that will solve the intractable problem of determining which materials
may be suppressed in a free and open society, the majority appears to
believe this will occur.
At five different places in the Miller v. California "' majority opinion, Chief
Justice Burger applied the short-hand test of "hardcore" pornography to the
materials that may now be legally suppressed. 14 The apparent assumption
was that everyone, like Justice Stewart, knows it when he sees it,15 and thus
there would be few problems applying the test. Realistically, however, one
senses that Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart know and mean very
different things by the phrase "hardcore pornography." Indeed, in the state
courts, "hardcore" has been a conclusory phrase invoked in decisions to
suppress supposedly obscene materials both before 6 and after1 7 Miller.
11. CABINET COMMITFEE
PRESmENT 38, 66 (1974).

ON
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REPORT
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12. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
13. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
14. Id. at 27, 28, 29, 35 & 36.

15. Justice Stewart stated:
pornography .

. .

"I shall not today attempt further to define hardcore

. But I know it when I see it .....

Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S.

184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
16. See, e.g., People v. Bloss, 18 Mich. App. 410, 171 N.W.2d 455 (1969), rev'd
mem. sub nom. Bloss v. Michigan, 402 U.S. 938 (1971).
17. Jenkins v. State, 230 Ga. 726, 199 S.E.2d 183 (1973),

rev'd sub nom. Jenkins
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Despite my doubts that the new test can be easily or sensibly applied, for
the purposes of ,this article I shall assume that it can. I shall also assume that
whatever obscenity is, we know it when we see it and thus have no further
definitional problems. Yet even with this concession, there still remain two
significant and related problems concerning obscenity and cable television.
The first problem is whether there is a constitutional standard for determining obscenity in filmed performances different than that for written words.
The second is a variant of the first: may a performance be suppressed if it is
cablecast, even though it would be protected if shown in a -theater or spoken
on a street corner? Both of these issues must be explored to determine the
legal status of offensive programming carried by cable.
A.

The ConstitutionalStandardfor Films

The Supreme Court has never decided whether a film could be suppressed
when a similar still picture or a written depiction of the same conduct could
not be suppressed. Like most other difficult issues, the available case law
provides ample support for any desired conclusion, but falls short of an
authoritative suggestion as to the likely result.
Although the Court in an early decision held that films were not to be
accorded the same state constitutional protections as speech and press, 18 the
Court's initial modern decision on film censorship brought films within first
amendment protections.1 9 The Court added a caveat, however, designed to
deal with the problems of the film medium: "[It does not] follow that motion
pictures are necessarily subject to the precise rules governing any other
particular method of expression. Each method tends to present its own
peculiar problems. '20 That case merely invalidated censorship which was
based on the ground that the film was sacrilegious. The Court expressly
noted that it was not dealing with "a clearly drawn statute designed and
applied to prevent the showing of obscene films,"2 '1but nevertheless added
a footnote which clearly implied that such a statute would be valid.22 The
decision was hardly startling; it occurred in 1952, and not for five more
v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
18. In a 19,15 diversity case, Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 236 U.S. 230
(1915), the Court held films to be beyond the protection of the free speech clause of the

Ohio constitution.
19. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
20. Id. at 503. This was reaffirmed in Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965),
in which the Court noted that "films differ from other forms of expression." Id. at 6061.
21. 343 U.S. at 506.
22. Id. at 506 n.20.
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years, until it decided Roth v. United States, 23 would the Court seriously

deal with obscenity in any way other than to announce in dicta that obscenity was unprotected. 24 Only in the 1960's did the Court begin facing issues
relating to films and obscenity.
In -the post-Roth era, the Court made no distinctions between films,
photographs and writings. Jacobellis v. Ohio25 involved a film, Manual
Enterprises v. Day26 and Redrup v. New York 27 involved photographs, and
A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v.

Attorney General28 concerned a writing. As far as anyone could tell, the Court
drew no relevant distinctions among them. When the majority in Stanley v.
23. 354 U.S. 476 (1957). In Roth, the Court upheld state and federal obscenity
statutes by concluding that obscenity was not protected by the first amendment: "[Ilmplicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly
without redeeming social importance." Id. at 484. Although the Court by its limited
grant of review (nowhere acknowledged in Roth itself) had excluded from consideration
the issue of whether the materials in question were obscene, it offered an advisory definition of obscenity. Material was obscene if "the average person applying contemporary
community standards [would find] the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to the prurient interest." Id. at 489 (footnote omitted).
24. Examples of the Court's former habit of stating in dicta that obscenity was
unprotected are contained in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942),
and Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
25. 378 U.S. 184 (1964). The film involved was Les Amants (The Lovers). The
Court reversed Jacobellis' conviction under an Ohio statute which prohibited the possession and exhibition of obscene films. As with many of the cases dealing with obscenity
there was no opinion for the Court, but as with A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs
of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 413 (1966), Justice Brennan's
opinion announcing the judgment of the Court has been treated as the most authoritative.
In Jacobellis, Justice Brennan emphasized that in applying the Roth test the "community"
indicated by that test was a national, as opposed to a local, community. Based on such a
national community standard, the opinion concluded that the movie was not obscene
under Roth. Id. at 192-95.
26. 370 U.S. 478 (1962). Justice Harlan's opinion announcing the judgment of the
Court in Manual Enterprisesgave added explanation to the Roth test. His opinion stated
that unless the material in question could be found to be patently offensive, it could not
be deemed obscene. Id. at 482. Appeal to the prurient interest was not the sole or selfsufficient test. Id. at 486.
27. 386 U.S. 767 (1967) (per curiam). Redrup indicated the Court's frustration with
obscenity cases and its inability to define successfully what constituted obscenity. The
per curiam opinion simply reiterated the various tests suggested by the justices in the
majority and then stated that whichever of the tests was applied, the material in question
was not obscene. Additionally, Redrup suggested that valid convictions might be secured
(a) under state obscenity statutes which showed a "concern for juveniles"; (b) in cases
involving material "so obtrusive as to make it impossible for an unwilling individual to
avoid exposure to it"; or (c) in cases involving pandering. Id. at 769.
28. 383 U.S. 413 (1966). In Memoirs, Justice Brennan's opinion announcing the
judgment of the Court further refined the Roth test. The opinion stated that in order to
satisfy the Roth test the work must be found to be "utterly without redeeming social
value," that is, "unqualifiedly worthless." Id. at 419.
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Georgia21 waxed eloquent about Stanley's "right to be free from state
inquiry into the contents of his library," 30 it was really talking about three
reels of eight millimeter film found in a desk drawer of an upstairs bedroom.
And the Burger majority's initial obscenity decision following Miller overturned the Georgia Supreme Court's conclusion that, even though it had
applied a more stringent definition of obscenity than Miller required, the film
Carnal Knowledge was nevertheless hardcore pornography.31 These cases
offer a potentially impressive display of the fact that the Court treats the
obscenity vel non of films, photographs, and writings alike.
Still, there is another side. There are troublesome indications that films
and writings are subject to different standards in obscenity adjudications.
First, it must be noted that a charge of obscenity against the films in some of
the cases would be laughable if the depiction were written. In 1964, the
Court reversed a conviction for the showing of a love scene "so fragmentary
and fleeting that only a censor's alert would make an audience conscious that
something 'questionable' is being portrayed. '3 2 In 1968, the objectionable
scene on which a conviction rested contained "two women, at least nude to
the waist, going though actions that could lead to no conclusion except that
they were behaving like lesbians." '33 And in 1974, it was Carnal Knowledge,
not Deep Throat, that the Justices went to the basement to view. Yet in none
of these cases did the Court note that it would be inconceivable that a book
could be censored for a similar portrayal.
One of Miller's companion cases, Kaplan v. California,8 4 raised the issue
of whether books without photographs could ever be held to be obscene. The
Court ruled that they could, but one cannot avoid noting the difference in the
content of the book from that of the movie:
It is made up entirely of repetitive descriptions of physical, sexual
29. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). Stanley had been convicted under a Georgia statute
outlawing the possession of obscene material. The material, three rolls of eight millimeter film, had been seized in Stanley's home by federal and state agents seeking
information on Stanley's alleged bookmaking activities. The Court overturned the conviction and held that the "mere private possession of obscene matter cannot constitutionally
be made a crime." Id. at 559.
30. Id. at 565.
31. Jenkins v. State, 230 Ga. 726, 199 S.E.2d 183 (1973), rev'd sub nom. Jenkins v.
Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974). After exhibiting the film at an Albany, Georgia movie
theater, Jenkins was convicted for the offense of distributing obscene materials. The
Georgia statute under which he was convicted employed the "utterly without redeeming
social value" test of Memoirs. See note 28 supra.
32. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197-98 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
33. State v. I. & M. Amusements, Inc., 10 Ohio App. 2d 153, 156, 226 N.E.2d 567,
569 (1966), rev'd per curiam, 389 U.S. 573 (1968).
34. 413 U.S. 115 (1973).
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conduct, 'clinically' explicit and offensive to the point of being
nauseous; there is only the most tenuous 'plot.' Almost every conceivable variety of sexual contact, homosexual and heterosexual, is
described. Whether one samples every 5th, 10th, or 20th page,
beginning at any point or page at random, the content is unvary35
ing.
Moreover, the only case during the four year Redrup era in which a finding
of obscenity was sustained involved a film. While busily "Redruping" all
obscenity cases, the Court granted certiorari and summarily affirmed the
judgment in Landau v. Fording,3 6 a California decision holding the film
version of Jean Genet's play, Un Chant d'Amour, to be obscene. The
exhibitors of the film admitted it was "stunningly frank in its search for the
truth" and that "the 'average man', if he chose to see this film, and if he did
not have access to the views of the expert witnesses who testified in this case,
might believe that its dominant theme is a 'shameful' interest in sex"; indeed
he "might" be "struck by the sexual candor of the film and be blind to its
deeper meaning."'37 When an exhibitor offers those concessions, it is not
surprising that the state court concluded that the film "is nothing more than
hard-core pornography and should be banned." 38
Another aspect of the California court's ruling in Landau was that a lesser
standard of proof applied to cases involving films. "Because of the nature of
the medium, we think a motion picture of sexual scenes may transcend the
bounds of the constitutional guarantee long before a frank description of the
same scenes in the written word."' 39 Given the Supreme Court's summary
affirmance, the exact basis of the decision is uncertain, but it could be
argued that the affirmance of Landau suggests -the existence of a variable
standard for the medium.
This reading of Landau finds considerable support in both Kaplan, dealing
with books, and Jenkins v. Georgia,40 involving a film. Twice in Kaplan the
majority went out of its way to suggest a special solicitude for books. It first
noted that the Court had "always rigorously scrutinized judgments involving
books for possible violation of First Amendment rights . . . . 41 The Court
added:
35. Id. at 116-17.
36. 388 U.S. 456 (1967), a!f'g per curiam 245 Cal. App. 2d 820, 54 Cal. Rptr. 177
(Ct. App. 1966).

37. Petition for Certiorari at 7-8, Landau v. Fording, 388 U.S. 456 (1967).
38. Fording v. Landau, 245 Cal. App. 2d 820, 830, 54 Cal. Rptr. 177, 183 (Ct. App.
1966).

39. Id. at 827, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 181.
40. 418 U.S. 153 (1974).

41. 413 U.S. at 118 n.3.
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Because of a profound commitment to protecting communication
of ideas, any restraint on expression by way of the printed word
or in speech stimulates a traditional and emotional response, unlike the response to obscene pictures of flagrant human conduct.
A book seems to have a different and preferred place in our hierarchy of values, and so it should be. But this generalization, like so
many, is qualified by the book's context. As with pictures, films,
paintings, drawings, and engravings, both oral utterance and the
printed word have First Amendment protection until they collide
with the long-settled position of this Court that obscenity is not pro42
tected by the Constitution.
The paragraph quoted comes close to indicating an implicit acceptance of the
long rejected ideas-entertainment distinction; 43 the Court seems to have
assumed that the printed word is more likely to present ideas than do other
media. Leaving aside the questionable validity of this assumption, the conclusion that books enjoy a preferred place in our hierarchy of values adds
support to the hypothesis that the printed word receives more preferential
treatment than films under the Court's obscenity standard.
When Jenkins rejected rthe finding that Carnal Knowledge could meet
the patently offensive standard, the Court stated what the film was not
doing: while "there are scenes in which sexual conduct including 'intimate
sexual acts' is to be understood to be taking place, the camera does not focus
on the bodies of the actors at such times. There is no exhibition whatever of
the actors' genitals, lewd or otherwise, during these scenes. There are
occasional scenes of nudity, but nudity alone is not enough. . . -44 One is
left to wonder what the result would have been had the film been more

sexually explicit. It seems relatively safe to conclude, however, that even
with such changes, a book making a narrative depiction of scenes like those
viewed in CarnalKnowledge would be fully protected.
Thus, within the array of cases from Jacobellis through Jenkins one can
find the Kaplan-Jenkins language supporting a distinction between films and
written depictions of obscenity. Moreover, the one notable inconsistency with
42. Id. at 119-20 (citation omitted).
43. See, e.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948), in which the Court stated:
We do not accede to appellee's suggestion that the constitutional protection for
a free press applies only to the exposition of ideas. The line between the
informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of that basic
right. Everyone is familiar with instances of propaganda through fiction.
What is one man's amusement, teaches another's doctrine. Though we can see
nothing of any possible value to society in these magazines, they are as much
entitled to the protection of free speech as the best of literature.
Id. at 510. See also Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 153 (1946).
44. 418 U.S. at 161.
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Redrup was a film case. Arrayed on the other side are holdings applying the
written word test to reverse lower court findings of film obscenity. Furthermore, on close analysis, Landau may not be a strong precedent for the
distinction. First, it was a five-to-4our decision with Justice Harlan joining the
majority. Because Landau was heard originally by a state court, Justice
Harlan would have voted to sustain the conviction as long as the state
applied "criteria rationally related to the accepted notion of obscenity and
that it reach[ed] results not wholly out of step with current American standards."'4 5 The decision below fell well within -that standard. Second, from the
exhibitor's concessions in his petition for certiorari, 4 6 it is possible that the
remaining four Justices could have agreed more readily than usual with the
court below that the film was indeed hardcore pornography. Finally, coming
48
immediately after Ginzburg v. United States47 and Mishkin v. New York,
the exhibitor's approach to the Court appears to have been aimed at carving
out a "willing intellectual" exception to its standard. Whatever the value of
such a potential test-and there may well have been something to it, given
what Stanley held a year later-there was a not insignificant problem of
49
commercialism. Although there was no "pandering" (whatever that is)
and the film was "shown to an audience somewhat more limited than the
general motion picture audience," the exhibitor "earned substantial amounts
from its exhibitions . . .-.
All of these factors serve to undermine any strong reliance on Landau as
support for the distinction that the lower court employed."' There are no
45. A Book Named "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Attorney
General, 383 U.S. 413, 458 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 496 (1957) (separate opinion of Harlan, J.).
46. See p. 725 & note 37 supra.
47. 383 U.S. 463 (1966). Ginzburg held that evidence of the circumstances of
production, sale and publicity of materials was relevant in determining whether the Roth
test was satisfied and that evidence of "pandering" might sustain a conviction in cases in
which the publications standing alone might not be obscene. Pandering was defined as
"the business of purveying textual or graphic matter openly advertised to appeal to the
erotic interest of ... customers." Id. at 467 (citation omitted).
48. 383 U.S. 502 (1966). In Mishkin, the Court held that when
material is designed for and primarily disseminated to a clearly defined deviant
sexual group, rather than the public at large, the prurient-appeal requirement
of the Roth test is satisfied if the dominant theme of the material taken as a
whole appeals to the prurient interest in sex of the members of that group.

Id. at 508.
49. For the Court's definition, see note 47 supra.
50. 245 Cal. App. 2d at 830, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 183.
51. Furthermore, it is dangerous to read too much into summary affirmances. As the
Chief Justice noted recently:
We might well go beyond [a tension between a summary affirmance and another court holding] and make explicit what is implicit in some prior hold-
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very helpful holdings either way. Nevertheless, intuitively, the validity of the
distinction seems to make sense.
In his recent book, The System of Freedom of Expression, Professor
Thomas I. Emerson wrote:
The judgment of whether any particular expression possesses social
value or no social value [or possesses or lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value] is not for the government to make.
If freedom of expression is to mean anything that judgment must
52
be made by the individual who speaks or wishes to hear.
Certainly Professor Emerson's words go to the core of the idea of free speech
in a democratic society. But one has to stop and think about the problems of
freedom of expression before coming to that position. An immediate, natural
reaction to various classes of expression is that some are important and
some are not. Even the libertarian Alexander Meiklejohn originally seems to
have taken such a position by suggesting that the first amendment should
protect only ideas necessary for self-government; the remainder of speech
problems should be treated as an aspect of due process.5 3 In Miller, the
Court openly embraced such a distinction when it concluded that suppressing
materials lacking serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value would
not significantly affect the system of freedom of expression.5 4 It is wrong,
Chief Justice Burger argued, to equate suppressible obscenity with "the free
and robust exchange of ideas and political debate." 55 For the Miller
majority, there is indeed a hierarchy of ideas.
An idea cannot be filmed. "A movie dealing expressly or extensively in
rational discussion would probably be judged a poor one by that measure,
ings....
When we summarily affirm, without opinion, the judgment of a
three-judge District Court we affirm the judgment but not necessarily the
reasoning by which it was reached. An unexplicated summary affirmance
settles the issues for the parties, and is not to be read as a renunciation by this
Court of doctrines previously announced

. . .

after full argument.

Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 391-92 (1975) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (citation
& footnote omitted). Although the problem is greater with three judge district courts,
in the rare case like Landau, in which a state decision is summarily affirmed and the
court below relies on more than one theory for decision, the case ought to be read as
settling the dispute, but not necessarily as affirming all the reasoning of the lower court.
52. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 489 (1970).
53. At least that was Professor Kalven's interpretation of Alexander Meiklejohn's
FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948). See Kalven, The
Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 16. Meiklejohn replied
that "novels and dramas and paintings and poems" would be fully protected under his
interpretation of the first amendment. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute,
1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245, 263.
54. See Comment, In Quest of a "Decent Society": Obscenity and the Burger Court,
49 WASH. L. ReV. 89 (1973).
55. 413 U.S. at 34.
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and its creators blamed for not making greater use of the peculiar gifts of the
medium, particularly its power to deal with visible reality." 56 Therein lies
the basis for the intuitive notion that films and written depictions may
deserve different treatment.
A book can deal with abstractions. A film is much less likely to do so
overtly. A film produces some form of reality according to its creator's
wishes. To communicate successfully, the film must concentrate on physical
objects and motion; dialogue is secondary. As the film communicates with
the viewer in a different manner than a book, so too the viewer communicates with the film differently than he would with a book. It ,takes effort to
read and comprehend. One must think about what the author is saying. If
the reader's mind wanders, all meaning may be lost, leaving the pages simply
a blur. This may not be, and probably is not, the case with viewing a film.
Often viewing will be subrational and subcritical. "The viewer can assume a
position of relative passivity and receptiveness, with little or nothing required
of him intellectually," 57 and a message will still be received. Thus, for some
types of communication, a film may well have an advantage over the written
word as a method of communicating: at the barest minimum, films can
communicate effectively with a much wider audience than can books.
Other differences between films and books which have been suggested5 8
are the darkness of the theater and the fact that one views a film as a part of
an audience rather than alone, as is normal with reading. While these are
valid differences, they seem less persuasive than the different communicative
aspects of films and books and probably cannot justify a distinction between
obscenity in the two.
On policy irounds I would prefer holding films and books to the same
standard. In effect, this would result in all but destroying obscenity law with
respect to films; probably only stag films would still be suppressed. Since I
believe that obscenity law is wholly misdirected as applied to consenting
adults, I favor doing anything possible to limit it. But once forced to concede
that obscenity law exists and can be applied, I have to admit that a
distinction between films and books seems proper not only as a matter of
common sense, but also as a function of the different ways in which the two
5 9
media communicate with their audiences.
.56. R.

RANDALL,

OF A MASS MEDIUM

CENSORSHIP OF THE

MoviEs: THE

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONTROL

67 (1968).

57. Id.

58. See id. at 68; Note, Motion Pictures and the First Amendment, 60

YALE

L.J. 696,

707-08 (1951).
59. In United States v. A Motion Picture Film, 404 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1968), Judges

Friendly and Lumbard debated this issue; Friendly saw no distinction between the
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There is one significant problem with the distinction: it discriminates
against those who do not read. Those who read will be able to obtain
materials that are more erotic than those who rely on films. As in other
areas, the literate and well-educated have an edge in the Supreme Court's
decisionmaking.6 0

As a predictive matter, I would expect the Court to allow the patently
offensive standard to be used as the legal vehicle for the distinction between
films and books. 6 1 Thus, to the extent -that obscenity laws may be applied to
cable television, contemporary community standards for films are likely to

authorize the suppression of materials that could not be censored if written.
B.

The ConstitutionalStandardforWords

The next point to consider is whether the government has the power to
prevent the use of language over television when it could not censor that
language on the street corner. Again the Supreme Court has never ruled on
this point. But the activity of the FCC provides an excellent indication of its
future regulatory policies. In dealing with offensive language, the FCC has
drawn on two dissimilar statutes which establish its sphere of regulatory
control. One is section 1464 of the criminal code, which provides penalties
for the broadcast of "any obscene, indecent, or profane language. '6 2 The
other is the more generalized public interest standard for the granting and
63
retaining of a broadcast license.
obscenity standards for books and films, while Lumbard's dissent, id. at 202, argued that
there existed such a distinction. Friendly's rejoinder asserted that the Second Circuit
cannot write on a clean slate when Supreme Court decisions point in one direction. Id. at
200. Lumbard has the better argument, however, since the Court's decisions point in all
directions.
60. Cf. Tushnet, "...
And Only Some Wealth Will Buy You Justice"--Some
Notes on the Supreme Court 1972 Term, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 177; Powe, The Supreme
Court and Sex Discrimination, 1 WOMEN L. REP. 1 (1974); see Salem Inn, Inc. v.
Frank, 501 F.2d 18, 21 n.3 (2d Cir. 1974) ("while the entertainment afforded by a nude
ballet at Lincoln Center to those who can pay the price may differ vastly in content (as
viewed by judges) or in quality (as viewed by critics), it may not differ in substance
from the [topless] dance viewed by the person who, having worked overtime for the
necessary wherewithal, wants some 'entertainment' with his beer or shot of rye." Id.)
The Supreme Court did not deal directly with the issue in affirming in part and reversing in part the judgment of the Second Circuit. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc. 95 S. Ct. 2561
(1975).
61. Some support for this is provided in Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974), in
which the Court listed what was not shown in the film during its discussion of "patent
offensiveness."
62. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1970) provides: "Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or
profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined not more than $10,000
or imprisoned not more than two years, or both."
63. 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(a), 307(d) (1970) provide that licenses may be granted and
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Despite the criminal code's specific language outlawing broadcast obscenity, the FCC initially eschewed reliance on that language. ,InPalmetto
Broadcasting Co.,6 4 it applied instead the amorphous public interest standard. In Palmetto, the charge was that the station, for a four month period,
had permitted the broadcast of material that was "coarse, vulgar, suggestive,
and susceptible of indecent double meaning." 65 On finding that the charge
was sustained by the facts, the FCC held that this was sufficient reason to
conclude that the licensee was not operating in the public interest. An appeal
produced no clarification since the District of Columbia Circuit, while noting
the FCC charge of broadcasting indecent material, affirmed on the Commission's alternative holding.66
The FCC at this time presented itself as an agency of restraint. Faced with
complaints concerning avant garde programs aired over the Pacifica stations
in California, the Commission, in Pacifica Foundation,67 noted that sanctioning the licensee for the programming in question (which included Edward
Albee's The Zoo Story) would probably limit programming to bland, wholly
inoffensive matters. The Commission emphasized its limited function in this
area and acknowledged that the programming was well within the licensee's
judgment. On its face the opinion was a solid victory for provocative programming. But less than two years later, the FCC, in actions rather than
words, dampened the victory by granting Pacifica's California stations only
a short-term renewal rather than the longer three year term.6 8 Instead of
dealing with the content of the programs, the Commission relied on the licensee's own admission that some programs were aired which did not conform to the station's programming policy.
The potential impact of Pacifica was realized in 1970. Using Palmetto and
Pacifica as a perfect pincers movement, the FCC put stations willing to air

provocative programming in a vise. On the one hand, programming might
fall outside the public interest standard or it might be obscene or indecent.
On the other hand, even if it were not, the FCC could sanction a licensee for
inadequate supervision under the licensee's own standards. For most licensees who aired unconventional programs, the problem was acute. Whether
renewed when "public convenience, interest, or necessity" will be served.
64. 33 F.C.C. 250 (1962).
65. Id. at 255.
66. Robinson v. FCC, 334 F.2d 534 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 843 (1964).
The court affirmed the Commission's position that when one owner of a radio station
was found to have misrepresented to the Commission his lack of awareness that allegedly
improper matter was being aired over the station, such misrepresentation in itself was
sufficient to justify denial of the owner's request for license renewal. Id. at 536.
67. 36 F.C.C.2d 147 (1964).

68. Pacifica Foundation, 2 F.C.C.2d 1066, 6 P &F RADIo REG. 2d 570 (1965).
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out of genuine concern or merely the desire to avoid questions about
operations in the public interest, a station might deplore certain types of
speech. But if such speech is transmitted over its frequency, the licensee can
not readily explain it.
Station KRAB-FM in Seattle became the first victim of the pincers
movement when, in response to an FCC inquiry about complaints, the
licensee admitted that a program it had aired was contrary to the station
policy. In Jack Straw Memorial Foundation, : the FCC granted KRAB a
limited renewal, not because the program was indecent, but because of
concern over whether the licensee was exercising proper supervision.
This sanction was applied to a station which provided "the Seattle area with
unusual, stimulating and extraordinary programs. KRAB's programming is
meritorious and the station does render an outstanding broadcast service to
'70
the area which it serves."
Although the FCC was not applying the statutory prohibition against
indecency or obscenity in Palmetto, Pacifica, and Jack Straw, the cases are
illustrative of the FCC's concern for these problems. In 1970, the Commission squarely moved from the fringes of the issue to the middle by holding
(in acase involving a noncommercial FM station in Philadelphia, licensed to
Eastern Education Radio) that the use of indecent language over the air on
a single program justified an order of forfeiture. 71 The program in question
was aired from 10:00 to 11:00 on a Sunday night. The bulk of the program consisted of a 'taped interview with Jerry Garcia of the rock group
known as the Grateful Dead. In addition to expressing his opinions on
ecology, music, philosophy, and interpersonal relations, Garcia frequently
interspersed the words "fuck" and "shit" throughout his comments. Since
the FCC majority felt Garcia's use of the terms was wholly gratuitous, it
held that the licensee had violated the prohibition in section 1464 against
broadcasting indecent language.
If the ruling in EasternEducation Radio7 2 was intended ,to clear the air of
indecency, the Commission was in for a surprise. Between June 1972 and
June 1973, complaints to the FCC concerning "obscenity-indecency-profanity" had a 15-fold increase from 2,141 to 32,438, well over 10,000 more than
the number of complaints received on all topics during the previous fiscal
year. 73 A significant factor in the jump was the advent of "Topless Radio,"
69. 21 F.C.C.2d 833 (1970).
70. Jack Straw Memorial Foundation, 29 F.C.C.2d 334, 351 (1971).
71. Eastern Education Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 408 (1970). The amount of the Order of
Forfeiture was $100.
72. 24 F.C.C.2d 408 (1970).

73. FCC News Release (Aug. 2, 1973).

1975]

Cable and Obscenity

live programs featuring a telephone conversation with a male host, in which
the caller, usually female, would disclose intimate personal and sexual details
over the air. The format began in California and soon moved eastward,
eventually spreading to such unlikely places as Dallas, despite the protests of
outraged listeners, station managers, 7 ' Broadcasting magazine, 75 and United
States senators. 76 In the spring of 1973, the FCC, quite responsive to this
type of complaint, moved decisively against the format. After having its staff
tape programs in different geographical areas, the FCC selected Sonderling
Broadcasting in a Chicago suburb as the target licensee. The majority found
the program "Femme Forum," broadcast on weekdays from 10:00 a.m. until
3:00 p.m., to be obscene. 77 The example used was a day when the topic was
oral sex. The majority applied the Roth-Memoirs test to the case and found
the program to be patently offensive, designed to appeal to the prurient
interest, and without redeeming social value. The majority also found the
program indecent when tested by the standards of Eastern Education. On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit affirmed the Commission's holding on the obscenity issue and chose
7s
not to discuss the indecency issue.
In Eastern Education, the FCC had created its own standard by relying on
the Memoirs test but eliminating the prurient interest standard. It retained
the requirements that the material be patently offensive and utterly without
redeeming social value. In holding that Garcia's language was utterly without
redeeming social value, the majority found that it was "gratuitous" and
that there was "no reason for its existence."'79 It rejected the argument that
the language was protected because it reflected the personality and life style
of Garcia and came during discussion of important issues.
The affirmance of the Sonderling decision, coupled with the realization
74. See BROADCASTING, Oct. 23, 1972, at 35.
75. BROADCASTING, March 5, 1973, at 74.
76. See BROADCASTING, Feb. 26, 1973, at 50.
77. Sonderling Broadcasting Corp., 41 F.C.C.2d 919 (1973), aff'd sub non. Illinois
Citizens' Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1974).

78. Illinois Citizens' Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir.
1974). The Court of Appeals modified the FCC's rationale somewhat. The court empha-

sized the pandering and titillation aspects of the program as a justification for the
finding of obscenity, but it reintroduced the probable presence of children as the
primary rationale for suppression. The court noted the scheduling of the program during
the daytime hours, the varied reasons why children might be exposed to the program,
and the station's knowledge that children were indeed within earshot of "Femme Forum."
Some advertising was directed to the 16-20 age group, and the record contained at least
one phone call to the station from an irate mother. Id. at 404. This made it easier to
find that no serious first amendment issue was presented.
79. 24 F.C.C.2d at 413.
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that subsequent Supreme Court decisions had made Eastern Education
somewhat dated, induced the FCC to redefine its standard in a case
involving Pacifica's 'New York City station, WBAI. 80 During an afternoon
program discussing contemporary society's attitudes toward language, WBAI
played a monologue by comedian George Carlin containing, as he so
correctly prophesized, "words you couldn't say on the public . . . airways."
The Commission issued a declaratory order holding the language to be
indecent in that the words were used in a manner "patently offensive by
contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium .... -81
This trio of cases is interesting both for the FCC's apparent conviction that
the results were correct and for its shifting rationale for suppression. In
Eastern Education, the Commission made clear its reasoning in attempting to
ban gratuitous indecency from the air. The majority postulated that not
imposing sanctions on this program would lead other stations to allow
similarly indecent language over the air. The result would be that "substantial numbers" of the listening population "would either curtail using radio or
would restrict their use to but a few channels or frequencies, abandoning the
present practice of turning the dial to find some appealing program. 82 This
would be inconsistent with the public interest in the "'larger and more
effective use of radio.' "88 The Commission also noted the problem of
84
children's access to such programming.
In Sonderling, the majority adhered to a similar theory: fears of thwarting
channel changing were buttressed with the fear of an application of Gresham's Law to the spread of this type of programming-a fear, incidentally,
that was undoubtedly more substantial than in Eastern Education, since
"Femme Forum" was the top rated radio show in the Chicago area.8 5 But
Sonderling went beyond Eastern Education when the majority noted that it
felt its decision justified even in -the absence of children's access to the programming. The Commission was disturbed by the "blatantness" of the discussion, which in its view demonstrated that the program was patently offensive. The pandering and titillation by the announcer led to the further
conclusion that the program lacked redeeming social value.
80. See Citizen's Complaint Against Pacifica Foundation Station WBAI (FM), 32
P & F RADio REG. 1331 (1975).

81. Id. at 1337. The Carlin monologue came from "Filthy Words," side 2, cut 5 of the
phonographic album George Carlin, Occupation: Foole. The appendix of the Commission's declaratory order contains a transcript of the monologue.
82. 24 F.C.C.2d at 411.
83. Id. at 410, quoting Communications Act of 1934, § 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (1970).
84. Id. at 411.
85. See 41 F.C.C.2d at 924 (Johnson, Comm'r, dissenting).
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Although spurred by -the rationale of the affirmance of Sonderling, the FCC
in WBAI shifted its attention toward the problem of children in the audience.
This at least provided a limiting rationale, and the FCC indeed suggested
that the result might be different in the late evenings when there was not a
reasonable risk of having children in -the listening audience. The FCC
announced that
the concept of "indecent" is intimately connected with the exposure
of children to language that describes, in terms patently offense
[sic] as measured by contemporary community standards for the
broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and organs, at
times of the day when there is a reasonable risk -that children may
be in the audience. 86
Underscoring the difference between indecency and obscenity, the FCC
added that the former lacks the element of appeal to the prurient interest,
and "when children may be in the audience, it cannot be redeemed by a
claim that it has literary, artistic, political or scientific value."' 87 Significantly,
despite the explicitness of what they were attempting to suppress, the
Commission offered no hint of what times might constitute late evening
hours.
Throughout the trio of cases, the FCC's approach to contemporary
community standards in the findings of "patently offensive" programming
has been the most interesting part of the opinions. Neither Eastern Education
Radio nor the Commission received a single complaint about the Philadelphia program,88 and in WBAI there was but a single complaint. Furthermore, the Commission had never specified what regions constituted the
relevant community in question. In Eastern Education it might have been the
nation at large, Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, or college students who were the
intended and probable audience of the station. A reading of the opinions
leads to the conclusion that the relevant community consists of the seven
persons serving as Commissioners of the Federal Communications Commission.
The problem of ascertaining the relevant community cannot be resolved by
assuming that the FCC is a perfect microcosm of that community. The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in
affirming Sonderling initially suggested that a jury trial might eventually solve
this problem. But given the FCC's belief that airing indecent or obscene
86. 32 P & F RADIo REG. 2d at 1336.
87. Id. at 1337.
88. The program came to the Commission's attention when the staff monitored it.
24 F.C.C.2d at 409 n.2.
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material could justify a refusal to renew a license, the court's suggestion was
illusory. Apparently the panel recognized this, and in a supplemental opinion
issued some months later,8 9 the court wrote that "the Commission must adopt,
in its deliberations leading to any substantive determination of obscenity, approaches that provide, as nearly as possible, the functional equivalent of a
jury determination of a clear community consensus that the material is lewd
and offensive." 9 0 While the court stated that "the Commission does not have
the free hand of bureaucratic censorship," 9' it is interesting to note that the
court did not apply the legal standard announced in Sonderling to the facts
of the case. Yet when the program suppressed is the top rated program in the
market, the conclusion that the community approves of it seems much easier
,to reach than the conclusion that it is patently offensive by community
92
standards.
When dealing with the problem of indecency as opposed to obscenity, it
seems that the FCC is off on an unconstitutional (although politically
89. 515 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1975). It is surprising that in the supplemental opinion, responding in part to a petition for a rehearing en banc and in part to Chief
Judge Bazelon's dissent from the failure to grant the petition, the court chose once
again to ignore the Supreme Court's consistent demand that the censoring party seek
immediate judicial review of any determination of obscenity. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965). If the FCC plans to censor programs dealing with
obscenity, some requirements as to speed and the burden of seeking judicial review will
have to be written into the statute. Cf. United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402
U.S. 363, 373-74 (1971). The Freedman test appears to apply to all prior censorship
regardless of the medium. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546
(1975).
90. 515 F.2d at 406-07. Although one suspects that the court's use of "lewd and
offensive" was not intended as a substitution for "patently offensive," the disturbing
quality both of the original and supplemental opinions lies in the court's desire to
affirm the FCC without attempting to harmonize the FCC's determination with the
applicable case law. This suggests the possibility that the court was introducing a new
and lesser standard for suppressing obscenity over the airwaves, while leaving the precise
definition of that standard for a later day. It was impossible for the FCC to make a
finding concerning the dominant theme of "Femme Forum"; it only had listened to a 22
minute segment with all nonsexual material deleted. The panel's justification for this
procedure-that listening is episodic-hardly distinguishes the case from that involving a book because reading too may be episodic. As Chief Judge Bazelon noted, the
court offered an exception to the rule that the work must be taken as a whole, an exception large enough to swallow the rule. Id. at 417. Nor is the court's use of the pandering
rationale, see Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966) convincing-the Commission never heard the entire programs involved, and the facts of Sonderling were not
similar to those in Ginzburg. The court's approach thus closely paralleled the Commission's in Eastern Education: it realized that the Supreme Court's obscenity cases would
not support its decision and therefore studiously avoided discussing those decisions.
91. 515 F.2d at 407.
92. Perhaps the answer to the problem of defining a clear community consensus lies
somewhere between total community approval and total community opprobrium.
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popular) frolic. In Eastern Education, the majority assumed that Garcia
would have no right to speak in public places in the manner he spoke on the
air. But if a war protestor's donning of a jacket with "Fuck the Draft"
printed on it is protected in a courthouse, as it was in Cohen v. California,93
on the rationale that unwilling viewers may avert their eyes---even though
some people must be present-then it is difficult to comprehend why
Garcia's language is not protected when it is broadcast over the air waves of
a station to which no one need listen. This is especially true when the
offended person has the opportunity to change the frequency. The FCC,
then, appears to be engaging in an attempt to bar the use of several
offensive words. Justice Harlan's argument in Cohen is no more answerable in Eastern Education than it was in Cohen, in which he stated: "[h]ow is
one to distinguish this from any other offensive word? Surely the State has no
right to cleanse public debate to the point where it is grammatically palatable
to the most squeamish among us."9°4 Eastern Education was decided prior to
Cohen on the assumption that a result such as that in Cohen was inconceivable. In WBA1, -the only mention of Cohen was as authority to support the
proposition .that "governmental action to prohibit intrusion into the privacy
of the home"95 is permissible-a point which when applied to radio and
television is not supported by the reasoning of Cohen.""
Just as the Miller majority's approach and the distinction between books
and films rests on some form of a hierarchy of ideas, so too does the FCC
action in this area. At first the Commission refused to believe it was affecting
ideas. In Eastern Education, its reasoning focused on the gratuitous nature of
the language. In Sonderling, the Commission found that "this was not a
serious discussion of sexual matters."197 But by the time WBAI was decided,
it found the question of serious discussion wholly irrelevant. The words were
per se indecent, except perhaps late at night. If ideas were affected, that was
too bad.
A decade ago FCC Commissioner Robert E. Lee protested against a Pacifica program entitled "Live and Let Live" which aired eight homosexuals
discussing their experiences and histories. Lee wrote that "when these
subjects [sexual aberrations] are discussed by physicians and sociologists, it
is conceivable that the public could benefit."9 8 Without such panelists, under
this view, the public could not benefit. The continuum between the current
93. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
94. Id. at 25.
95. 32 P & F RADIO REG. 2d at 1337.
96. See p. 745 inlra.
97. 41 F.C.C.2d at 920.
98. Pacifica Foundation, 36 F.C.C. 147, 152 (1964) (Lee, Comm'r, concurring).
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Commission's position and Lee's is uncomfortably close. What the Commission has overlooked is that speech embodies the emotive aspects and life
style of individual personality. Garcia in part "intended to show disrespect"
for established standards. 9a Cohen's diatribe, as one of my students once
suggested during a discussion of the case, could hardly have been more
effective in briefly indicating the intensity of his opposition to the draft and
the war. As Justice Harlan warned, one cannot be certain that the "facile
assumption that one can forbid particular words without also running a
substantial risk of suppressing ideas" will hold. 10 0 The Supreme Court has
already stated that a state cannot reduce the adult population intellectually to
"only what is fit for children."'' But, as with Justice Harlan's opinion in
Cohen, the FCC has again weighed in with its dissent.
It seems unlikely that the Commission's effort to purify the language will
succeed. Others will use obscene or indecent language even though, with its
position in Sonderling affirmed, the FCC's hand was strengthened and the
Commission was immediately encouraged to take stronger action. Assuming
the Commission attempts to apply its obscenity and indecency standards to
cablecasting, it will be necessary to look closely at the potential rationales for
that course of action as they apply to cable rather than broadcasting.
II. OBSCENITY AND CABLE
A.

The Rationale for Regulation

There is no doubt that for first amendment purposes broadcast media and
other media receive different treatment on the issue of content control by the
government. If anyone had doubts, Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo'0 2 put them to rest. Naturally it would be advantageous for cable to
be treated like a nonbroadcast medium rather than as part of -the broadcast
media. 10 3 At a minimum this would mean that there would be no questions
99. Eastern Education Radio, 24 F.C.C.2d 408, 419 (1970) (Cox, Comm'r, concurring in part and dissenting in part).
100. 403 U.S. at 26.
101. Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957). In the case of material which is
violent or sexually oriented but not obscene or indecent (in the minds of the Commissioners), the Commission recognizes the very problem it ignores here. See FCC Report
on the Broadcast of Violent, Indecent and Obscene Material, FCC Docket No. 75-202 at
4 (Feb. 19, 1975).
On the special regulatory problems concerning children, see pp. 746-48 infra.
102. 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (state statute granting a political candidate a right to equal
space to reply to a newspaper's criticism and attacks on his record or character violates
the first amendment guarantee of a free press).
103. There is now no judicial opinion suggesting a rationale for treating cable
differently under the first amendment from the print media. Given the presumption
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raised concerning indecency and, given the experience with movie theaters,
substantially more tolerance towards obscenity would be shown. To analyze
whether it is likely for cable to receive this treatment, it is useful to look first
at the rationale for broadcast content regulation. Although several reasons
have been suggested at one time or another, only three have solid legal or
analytical underpinnings: scarcity, power, and imposition. In addition, the
problem of children's access, moved to the forefront by the affirmance of
Sonderling, must be considered.
Although some have argued that the scarcity theory lacks an empirical
foundation and is based on faulty economics, 0 4 it has been the favorite
rationale for content regulation of broadcasting by both the FCC10 5 and the
Supreme Court.10 6 If scarcity is indeed the reason for content regulation,

then cable will be immune from such governmental interference since no one
postulates scarcity as a factor in cable. Indeed, the enthusiasm for cable
comes from just the opposite view: a belief that abundance will offer as
much diversity as could be desired.
Many individuals of diverse backgrounds hold the opinion that television
is a medium of unique power. 10 7 Although Marshall McLuhan probably is
the one who provided the most currency for the general idea, the power
advocates in the United States have worried about a very different
problem-that television might well be shaping public events. The best
against governmental influence on content decisions in the media, one could expect that
prior to treating cable differently from the other media of abundance, some good
justifications would have to be forthcoming. As this section will demonstrate, there are
no such justifications.
Consideration of whether cable should be treated as a common carrier would not
affect the outcome of a restraint on the cablecasting of obscene or indecent materials.
This type of content restriction, demanding that certain programs never be brought
forward, has no relationship to problems of ownership and programming. The common
carrier concept, separating ownership from programming, would be relevant to access
doctrines (such as fairness, equal opportunities, and maybe the requirement of diverse
program service), see Barrow, The FairnessDoctrine: A Double Standard for Electronic
and Print Media, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 659, 692-96 (1975), although it is hardly clear that it
would support those doctrines beyond a requirement of nondiscriminatory access to
appropriate channels.
104. See, e.g., Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Observations on 40
Years of Radio and Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REV. 67 (1968); Sullivan,
Editorials and Controversy: The Broadcaster's Dilemma, 32 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 719
(1964).
105. See, e.g., FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBmILrrY IN BRoADcAsTINo 184 (J. Coons ed.
1961) (Comments of FCC Chairman Newton Minow).
106. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
107. For a different analysis of the power theory, see Comment, Power in the
Marketplace of Ideas: The Fairness Doctrine and The First Amendment, 52 TEX. L.
REV.727 (1974).
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known advocate of this viewpoint was former Vice President Spiro Agnew.
But others both in the middle and on the opposite side of -the political
spectrum have taken similar positions. The keystone of the power theory is
the amount of television watched by the average viewer. The significance
and impact of the medium are apparent when either the six hours and 49
minutes each day the average home has its set on,' 0 8 or the estimated 66
percent of the adult population that sees some television each day, 10 9 are
considered. The significance of the statistics is underscored by the 64 percent
of the population that turns to television as the source of most of its news
and the 48 percent that finds television as the most believable news
medium. 110 Although it is difficult to know precisely what the statistics
mean, they may well provide some basis for the conclusion that television is
indeed powerful.
The power theory not only has factual support, it has legal support which
exactly parallels the scarcity theory. While Justice Frankfurter offered the
latter as his rationale for regulation in National Broadcasting Co. v. United

States,' Justice Murphy suggested the former when he stated that
because of its vast 'potentialities as a medium of communication,
discussion and propaganda, the character and extent of control that
should be exercised over it by the government is a matter of deep
and vital concern. Events in Europe show that radio may readily
be a weapon of authority and misrepresentation, instead of a means
of entertainment and enlightenment. It may even be an instru112
ment of oppression.
A quarter century later, when in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC113

the Supreme Court turned to content regulation, scarcity and power theories
became intertwined in the Court's opinion. Although it was essentially a
reaffirmation of the scarcity rationale, running throughout the opinion is the
idea of media power. In upholding ,the constitutionality of the fairness
doctrine as applied to a personal attack rule situation, the Court moved its
antitrust views as expressed in Associated Press v. United States'1 4 into the

forefront. Monopoly power cannot be allowed or trusted in the marketplace
of ideas. "There is no sanctuary in the First Amendment," the Court wrote
in Red Lion, "for unlimited private censorship operating in a medium not
108. See 1975
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

BROADCASTING YEARmooK 2.
See 1973 BROADCASTING YEARBOOK 71.
See 1975 BROADCASTING YEARBOOK 2.
319U.S. 190 (1943).
Id. at 228 (Murphy, J.,dissenting).
395 U.S. 367 (1969).

114. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
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open to all." 115 And in some instances there is little hope of dissipating the
problem of monopoly even if competition suddenly developed, since confirmed habits of viewers may well provide the existing stations with a
competitive advantage over their newer competitors. 116
The Court's Red Lion opinion places the power theory on somewhat
firmer ground than the previous speculation that television must be powerful
because so many people spend so much time watching it. Red Lion infused
that power theory with an antitrust conception. This conception has been in
the mainstream of concern during -the entire history of radio regulation,
beginning with the father of the Communications Act, Senator Clarence C.
Dill,117 to the FCC's chain broadcasting regulations, to Justice Frankfurter's affirmance of those regulations in National Broadcasting.A monopoly in
the marketplace of ideas would be intolerable.
The antitrust idea of power fits nicely with the scarcity idea. No matter
how many outlets there are, it seems as if there are only three voices
speaking: CBS, NBC, and ABC. Viewed from this perspective not only does
the scarcity rationale have some validity, but a genuine oligopoly has
captured the medium. And for many people, the historic American distrust of
power is fused with a new fear of power influencing ideas and events by
shaping opinions. It is this combination of visible oligopoly and suspected
influence on behavior that gives the power theory its strong support as the
rationale for regulation.
The antitrust underpinnings of the power theory also remove the disquieting aspect of that rationale for content regulation. In its starkest form the
power theory is supported by the conclusion that the content of the media
can be regulated simply because the media exert a large potential influence
on society. No matter how that argument is dealt with, it strikes uncomfortably near the core of the first amendment. The Washington Post and the New
York Times have enormous impact and are powerful voices of communication, yet no one seriously believes they can be regulated." 8 Furthermore,
the concept of truth winning out in the marketplace of ideas renders the
power of the medium irrelevant. The antitrust concept, however, permits the
focus to shift to the fear that truth will not win out because only a few
limited ideas will ever be permitted to appear. Like the economic marketplace, the intellectual marketplace might well be flawed.
115. 39.5 U.S. at 392.
116. See id. at 400.
117. See Hearings on S.1 and S.1754 Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate
Commerce, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 123 (1926).
118. See generally New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
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If the power theory is indeed its real rationale for regulation, then the
Court must face, as with the scarcity rationale, the rather tough questions directed at its factual validity. 119 Furthermore, one wonders why the less drastic
alternative of enforcing the Sherman Act would not render content regulation
unconstitutional. But as to cable these objections will not matter. With cable's
abundance of viewing options, the antitrust problems of concentration should
vanish and with them -therationale for content regulation. 120
The imposition theory is a variant of the power theory. There is little
doubt that television carries with it a considerable power to offend some
viewers. Too much sex or violence accomplishes this with some regularity.
When some people complain of the "power" of television they may actually
mean its power to be offensive. Here they are on solid ground. Thus, the
final plausible theory for content regulation is that the media must be
regulated to limit its undoubted capacity to give offense to its quasi-captive
audience.
From the time the problems relating to the captive audience first arose,
the Court demonstrated a sensitivity to the plight of the individual who
desired not to hear. Naturally, a considerable amount of balancing with the
first amendment rights of the speaker was necessary. The result has been to
defer to the speaker's rights everywhere except in the listener's home.' 21 As
Chief Justice Burger recently wrote in Rowan v. Post Office Department:122
We . . . categorically reject the argument that a vendor has a
right under the Constitution or otherwise to send unwanted material into the home of another. If this prohibition operates to impede the flow of even valid ideas, the answer is -that no one has
a right to press even "good" ideas on an unwilling recipient. 23
The captive audience concept is a strong one carrying its own first
amendment and right to privacy overtones. When it can be successfully
invoked, it immediately stops communication between -the parties and may
justify criminal sanctions against the continuation of the speech.' 24 To the
119. See Comment, supra note 107 (a devastating attack on a version of the power

theory without its antitrust underpinnings). See also Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibility
of the Broadcaster:Reflections on Fairness and Access, 85 Huv. L. REv. 768 (1972).
120. See Note, Cable Television and the First Amendment, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1008,

1021 (1971).
121. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Organization for a Better Austin

v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971); Rowan v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970);

Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951); cf. Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S.
451 (1952).
122. 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
123. Id.at 738 (1970).
124. For example, in Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951), Breard's violation
of an Alexandria ordinance resulted in a sentence of 30 days or a $25 fine. Id. at 625.
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extent it can be applied to the context of television, it would permit one or
more disgruntled viewers to suppress any programming of which they
disapprove.
On its face the concept has no applicability to the problems of television.
In Rowan, the Court upheld a statute allowing an addressee to demand that
his name be removed from mailing lists, stating that to "hold less would tend
to license a form of trespass and would hardly make more sense than to say
that a radio or television viewer may not twist the dial to cut off an offensive
or boring communication and thus bar its entering his home."'1 25 The Court's
statement recognized the obvious. The disgruntled viewer retains his own
self-help remedy against offensive programming.
While there has been no captive audience holding with respect to television programming, the rationale nevertheless has received judicial attention.
In Banzhaf v. FCC,1 26 Chief Judge Bazelon, now a dissenter with respect to
the fairness doctrine, 1 27 authored his court's most extreme extension of -that
doctrine (albeit under the guise of the public interest standard). Applying
the captive audience doctrine to product commercials, he wrote the following
passage:
Written messages are not communicated unless they are read, and
reading requires an affirmative act. Broadcast messages, in contrast, are "in the air." ,Inan age of omnipresent radio, there
scarcely breathes a citizen who does not know some part of a leading cigarette jingle by heart. Similarly, an ordinary habitual television watcher can avoid these commercials only by frequently
leaving the room, changing the channel, or doing some other such
affirmative act. It is difficult to calculate the subliminal impact
of ,this pervasive propaganda, which may be heard even if not listened to, but it may reasonably be thought greater than the impact
128
of the written word.
After its initial presentation, the captive audience idea remained dormant in
the years following Banzhaf. Used there to justify messages countering what
were -thought to be the implicit messages in cigarette commercials, it had
The statute sustained in Rowan provides for compliance through a district court's contempt powers. See 39 U.S.C. § 4009(e) (1970). There is no reason why more severe
sanctions could not be imposed for the violation of a valid law requiring someone to
cease his intrusive speech.
125. 397 U.S. at 737.
126. 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
127. See Brandywine-Main Line Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 63 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting). See also Citizens Comm. to Save WEFM v. FCC, 506
F.2d 246, 268 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring).
128. 405 F.2d at 1100-01.
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spent its initial usefulness. Regulatory issues turned upon determining which
29
commercials needed to be countered.'
When the captive audience rationale next appeared in a case involving
television, it was used in its more traditional application to justify a decision
not to put certain programming on the air. This time it was Chief Justice
Warren Burger, not Chief Judge David Bazelon, speaking. Reversing a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
which held that the FCC must require stations to cease barring all editorial
advertising, Burger quoted the passage from Banzhaf in support of his conclusion. He prefaced the Banzhaf quote with the conclusion that the FCC "is
also entitled to take into account the reality -that in a very real sense listeners
and viewers constitute a 'captive audience.' "130
As Justice Brennan in a dissenting opinion remarked with respect to the
captive audience rationale, the "suggestion that constitutionally protected
speech may be banned because some persons may find the ideas expressed
offensive is, in itself, offensive to the very meaning of the First Amendment."'l One might minimize somewhat the jarring quality of the use of the
captive audience rationale by noting that it was accepted in the context of
refusing to order members of the broadcast media to change their policy of
accepting only the advertising they wished to air and only putting forth
editorials of their own choosing. The result, if not the reasoning, becomes
consistent with first amendment principles.
Despite the justifiable result, the reasoning stood Banzhaf on its head by
using the captive audience rationale to suppress additional debate rather
than attempting to expand it. A similar misreading of the Rowan analogy
between the mails and television could provide the final link to the full use
of the captive audience rationale. The Rowan analogy was that to allow an
individual to bar the mailing of items to him was the equivalent of the
acknowledged right of a television viewer to twist the dial in the face of
unacceptable programming. But the analogy does not hold. The television
viewer avoids offensive programming either by not turning on his set or by
switching channels or turning off the set as quickly as possible when an
offensive program appears. In the mail box situation, the analogous actions
would be either to throw away unopened all mail from unknown or
objectionable correspondents or to open the letters and, as quickly as
129. See, e.g., Friends of the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Green
v. FCC, 447 F.2d 323 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Retail Store Employees Local 880 v. FCC, 436
F.2d 248 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
130. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 127
(1973).
131. Id. at 194-95 n.35 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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possible, discard all offensive materials. In the latter situation the addressee
is, like the spectators in Cohen, initially offended but able to avoid further
offense by averting his eyes. The same is true of one watching television who
becomes offended. Further offense can be avoided by a quick switch of the
dial.
Although the Rowan analogy is fallacious, it nevertheless is made. Having
stood Banzhaf on its head, is it not possible that the Court might attempt to
do the same with Rowan? The new analogy would proceed from the result in
Rowan. Since an addressee can stop all offensive literature from entering his
mailbox, a viewer must have the analogous right to prohibit all offensive
programming from entering his television set. Just as the post office is the
intermediary in one, the best mechanism for the other would be some
governmental agency properly charged with the realization that viewers are a
captive audience. Just as Rowan ignored the possibility that the addressee
could quickly dispose of unwanted materials, this new analogy would ignore
the ability of viewers to turn the dial.
One would hope that the day for this illogical and repressive reasoning
1 32
will never come. A very recent obscenity case, Erznoznik v. Jacksonville,
suggests that in the near future it will not. In striking down an ordinance that
prohibited the showing of any motion picture in which nudity is portrayed in drive-in theatres 'in which the screen is visible from any public place,
the Court properly noticed that rights of others-the owners as well as patrons
who wish to see such films in drive-ins-are affected by such ordinances.' 3
Similarly, rights of others besides the offended are affected by the potential
use of the captive audience rationale in cable television. The rationale is so
startling and dangerous in its reach that a careful guard must be maintained
to protect against any of its unwarranted extensions. As long as viewers
remain free to switch channels or turn off their sets, the captive audience
rationale has no place in regulatory theory. But it is -this rationale-and this
one alone-which could provide the link between the current regulatory
pattern of broadcasting and the future regulation of cable.
Although the captive audience rationale has twice appeared in the context
of commercial advertising, it cannot be dismissed as general theory by
taking the position that it is an outgrowth of the commercial speech exception
to the first amendment. 34 Whatever the contours of that exception, editorial
advertisements have no place within the category. 135 Thus, the captive
132. 95 Sup. Ct. 2268 (1975).
133. Id. at 2273-74 n.7.
134. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376 (1973); Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
135. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
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audience exception must be given somewhat more generalized treatment.
One obvious way to limit the imposition on an unwilling viewer is to
provide accurate information in advance as to why a given program might
prove to be offensive. This would allow the sensitive viewer to avoid all
problems before they occur. There always can be quibbles with the adequacy
of any warnings, as the Court's remarks concerning the "adults only"
warning in one obscenity case demonstrate, 8l 0 but in theory at least this
should prove a sufficient means of avoiding most captive audience problems
with programming.
Two further problems remain. One relates to potential interruptions of
programming with offensive messages. This has been the normal situation for
the captive audience theory in the past. 1 37 With respect to obscenity
interruptions in cable, these probably would not be a factor since most likely
any problems will flow from the programming itself, not from commercial or
other interruptions.
The other problem may be more difficult. The Court has long recognized
a societal interest in protecting children from obscenity, and has even gone so
far as to sanction a prohibition on its distribution to minors that would be
unconstitutional if applied to adults. 1 8 Books and magazines must be
purchased and affirmatively brought into the home, but television is easily
accessible to children. Here the potential problems with offensive programs
are that children may either accidentally turn on a set or intentionally fail to
switch one off. Technologically this problem perhaps could be solved by
some form of lock device whereby certain channels that may offer offensive
programs cannot be operated without a special key. That key can be placed
under parental control to prevent access by children. Any arguments then
would be reduced to either the problems of children obtaining the key or the
"irresponsible" parent.
In Ginsberg v. New York,'8 9 while upholding the New York prohibition
on sales to minors, the Court noted that "the prohibition against sales to minors does not bar parents who so desire from purchasing the magazines for
their children.' 40 In essence, the Court approved the statute as a legislative
aid to parental discretion. If the child obtains the key and thus is able to
watch what may be thought of as harmful or offensive programs, then the
situation is analogous to that of the child who obtains access to his parents'
136. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 52 (1973).
137.
138.
139.
140.

See Note, supra note 120, at 1022.
See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
390 U.S. 629 (1968).
Id. at 639.
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obscene (or obscene for children) materials. As there is currently no law
demanding wholly effective parental supervision, it seems unreasonable to
postulate one in the future unless the real concern is with "irresponsible"
parents who willingly let their children view obscenity.
In Ginsberg, the Court also sustained the statute on the ground that the
state has its own independent interest in the well-being of children. 141 How
far the state interest in protecting minors from the moral "irresponsibility" of
their parents would extend is difficult to know. Yet unless the Court is
ready to turn its back substantially on Butler v. Michigan,142 the interest in
protecting children from parents who might let them watch morally offensive
programs would stop far short of reducing the adult population to viewing
only "what is fit for children."' 43 Less restrictive alternatives, such as
prosecution of the offending adult (assuming the state interest is that great),
would still allow the remainder of the population to see adult programs.
This review of the potential rationales for content regulation of cable
programming leads to the conclusion that only the captive audience theory
might have potential as a possible justification for regulating cable programming. But that justification is so weak and the captive audience theory is so
dangerous that it too provides insufficient support for regulation. Thus, those
standards that may be applied to broadcasting which are different from the
standards applied to other mediums of communication have no place in the
consideration of cable. For purposes of obscenity and indecency, cable must
44
be treated under the appropriate standard for either films or literature.
141. Id. at 640.
142. 352 U.S. 380 (1957) (statute making it a misdemeanor to sell or make available
books containing language tending to corrupt morality of youth found violative of due
process).
143. Id. at 383.
144. Advocates of the neoliberal theory of governmental "enhancement" of the
marketplace of ideas may well dissent from this proposition. See, e.g., J. BARRON,
FREEDOM OF ThE PRESS FOR WHOM? (1973); Barrow, supra note 103. For those who
desire some governmental content control-to increase, of course, the information
available to the public--even the diversity of cable could be used as an argument against
freeing it from regulation. It has already been suggested that because of the probable
audience fragmentation there is too great a risk that the public will be uninformed
because members might make the wrong choice in watching the wrong channel. Thus not
only is the public interest thought to require the availability of access channels (although
making cable a common carrier would accomplish the same thing), but also to require
the operator to police the access channels and choose "issues for presentation." Naturally, a well-meaning governmental agency would be available to back up and assist in the
choices. See id. at 702-05.
If one could point to numerous glowing successes of governmental regulation, especially by the FCC, then there might be a great deal more to say for the proposition that
governmental enhancement of the marketplace of ideas would be worth the necessary
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Thus, at a minimum, obscenity regulation for cable must be limited to
suppression of materials that could be suppressed if shown in a local theater.
B.

Obscenity in the Home

In holding that consenting adults had no right to view obscene films in
theaters, Chief Justice Burger reminded us that one cannot "compare a
theater open to the public for a fee, with the private home.'' 45 Television,
however, is watched in the home and to the extent one may have additional
rights in his home -these may become relevant in dealing with cable and
obscenity.
The origin of additional first amendment rights in the home is Stanley v.
Georgia, 46 in which the Supreme Court held that mere possession of obscene
material in the home cannot constitutionally be made a crime. In Stanley, the
Court delineated the two rights at issue: the right to receive information regardless of social worth, and the right to be free from unwanted governmental intrusions into privacy. Intertwining these rights, the Court reached the
conclusion that "[i]f the First Amendment means anything, it means that a
State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what
books he may read or what films he may watch."'1 47
But Stanley was not only the beginning of the doctrine of additional first
amendment rights in the home; it was also its high point. Both the holding
and the language used in Stanley seemed to encompass a right of willing
adults to receive obscene materials, but as soon as the opportunity arose to
reaffirm that theory, the Court quashed it. In -the process of quashing that
prospect the Court, now reconstituted, eagerly limited Stanley.' 48 The first
amendment basis of Stanley was virtually ignored as the Court concentrated
on the privacy aspect of that case. That decision, the Court said in Paris
first amendment reinterpretation. But when the gains are so speculative-the agency
would have to be effective and the audience must either want to be, or be cajoled into
being, better informed-it seems clear to this observer that the neoliberal view of the
first amendment is not the preferable one. We can control and indeed avoid private
monopoly in cable communications and that course is a much wiser one than assuming
that governmental content regulation will solve any problems as they arise. See generally
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 148 (1973)
(Douglas, J., concurring); RoSCOE POUND-AMERICAN TRIAL LAWYERS FOUNDATION,

THE FirsT AMENDMENT AND THE NEws MEDIA-FINAL REPORT 21-29 (1973) (this
report was issued by the Annual Chief Justice Earl Warren Conference on Trial Advocacy in the United States).
145. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973).
146. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
147. Id. at 565.
148. See Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
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Adult Theater I v. Slaton,'149 turned on the old concept that a man's home is
his castle. The protection of Stanley "is restricted to a place, the home." I 0
It depended "not on any First Amendment right to purchase or possess
obscene materials, but on the right to privacy in the home." 15 1 And for
anyone who remained ready to argue the first amendment basis for Stanley
came the rather sharp warning that if the case were not limited as the Court
15 2
had suggested, then it would no longer be the law.
A right to view obscenity in the home can only be supported, if at all, by
Stanley. But reliance on Stanley is extraordinarily shaky. Reading Stanley
and the Miller Quintet1 53 with the hope that there is room for a right to view
obscene materials over cable television without governmental interference
leads to the almost inescapable conclusion that the hope is illusory.
With the exception of obscenity, all other state regulations affecting
freedom of expression must be supported by ample justification. But with
obscenity it took from Roth until Slaton before even a hint of the justification for the regulation appeared. Against this background it is hazardous
to predict whether the justifications in fact have any application to a new
medium such as cable television.
Two of the rationales already have been mentioned. One is the shock
effect of seeing obscenity; there is little to be said here beyond noting the
self-help remedy of switching the dial and requiring advance warnings of the
type of programming. The other rationale deals with the problem of children,
and here technology offers solutions. In addition, there are the two rationales
stated in Slaton: the quality of life and the problem of the adverse effects of
exposure to obscenity. Both are difficult to evaluate.
The Court in Slaton found it irrelevant that there is "no scientific data
which conclusively demonstrates that exposure to obscene material adversely
affects men and women or their society."15 4 The basis for this conclusion
was that since obscenity is not speech this is not an area in which the
Constitution intrudes. Thus, the legislature has ample leeway for its own
judgments. Further,
149. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).

150. Id. at 66 n.13.
151. United States v. 12 200-Foot Reels of Super 8 mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123, 126
(1973).
152. Id. at 127.
153. See note 2 & accompanying text supra.

154. 413 U.S. at 60 (1973). The majority continued: "[I]t is not for us to resolve
empirical uncertainties underlying state legislation, save in the exceptional case where

that legislation plainly impinges upon rights protected by the Constitution itself." Id. The
majority should have underscored that comment by adding: "such as the right to an
abortion prior to the end of the second trimester of pregnancy." See Roe v. Wade, 410

U.S. 113 (1973).
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[the] sum of experience, including that of the past two decades,
affords an ample basis for legislatures to conclude that a sensitive,
key relationship of human existence, central to family life, community welfare, and the development of human personality, can be
debased and distorted by crass commercial exploitation of sex.1 55
It is one thing to quarrel with the Court's factual premises, but if it is going
to apply the standard of review for due process in economic legislation, as it
did, 150 then a fear 'that viewing obscenity may lead to crime, even if
probably wrong, is sufficient to justify legislation. Stanley expressly rejected
the speculative deterrent theory for the home, however, and to the extent
Stanley has vitality, the state interest in avoiding criminal sexual behavior
cannot override the right to have obscenity in the home.
The conclusion is inescapable that in Slaton the Court felt that the most
substantial reason for regulating obscenity went to the quality of life. The
opinion reflects former Chief Justice Warren's call from Jacobellis that
the Court allow "States to maintain a decent society.' 157 Besides quoting a
long passage from Professor Bickel to this effect, 158 the Slaton Court offered
its own support. The rights and interests involved include "the interest
of the public in the quality of life and the total community environment,
the tone of commerce in the great city centers .

" 159

Such justifications

in a first amendment case are startling. One perceptive commentator has
aptly summed up their potential reach by noting that "[t]he 'decent society'
sanctioned by the Chief Justice entails more than cleaning up 42nd Street or
Times Square; he envisions a society where men and women act cleanly
60
because they think cleanly."'
The semicolon in that commentator's sentence sets apart a restrictive and
an expansive reading of Slaton. If indeed the Court is searching for a decent
society "where men and women act cleanly because they think cleanly," ,then
there is no chance at the present of expecting any liberalization favoring
cable viewing. But if the state's interests are limited to what the Court stated
in fact, then the case for obscenity and cable is not wholly closed.
"Cleaning up 42nd Street or Times Square" is a good shorthand expression for exactly what -the Court was suggesting. The terms "tone of com155.
156.
157.
158.

Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63 (1973).
See id. at 61-64.
378 U.S. 184, 199 (1964) (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
413 U.S. at 59, quoting Bickel, On Pornography: Dissenting and Concurring

Opinions,22 THE PUBLIC INTEREST 25-26 (1971).

159. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 (1973).
160. See Comment, supra note 54, at 120.
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merce,"'' 1 "crass commercial exploitation," 1 62 and "commerce in obscene
books, or public exhibitions focused on obscene conduct"' carry with them
the suggestion that it is the outward commercialism surrounding obscenity
that disturbs -the Court. In part it would help explain the Court's continued
reliance on business regulation cases for setting the standards for judging
legislative determinations. The Court's lengthy quotation from Professor
Bickel supports this reading of the case. While he concluded that private
reading of obscenity was all right, he went on to state that if the reader
demands a right to obtain the books and pictures he wants in the
market, and to foregather in public places-discreet, if you will, but
accessible to all-with others who share his tastes, then to grant
him his right is to affect the world about the rest of us, and to im04
pinge on other privacies.
It is altogether possible for a cleanup of the dirty bookshops in the city to
exist side by side with private use of obscenity in the home. If it is the
aesthetics of the city that concerns the Court, then they are not affected
importantly by private persons obtaining obscenity, at least 'as long as those
obtaining obscenity do not misbehave. On the other hand, if a "decent
society" includes freedom from concern that someone is enjoying obscenity,
then there could be little tolerance for cablecasting obscenity since that
would provide a much wider audience than otherwise expected for nonbroadcast obscene matter.
This choice is in part quite similar to the one made in the abortion
decisions.' 6 5 Since few persons are likely to witness an abortion, what
bothers many is the certain knowledge that somewhere someone may be
having an abortion. That interest could not block the decision in Roe and
Doe once the privacy interest had been defined. In a similar vein, the Court
could allow the cablecasting of obscenity into the home on the ground that
the interest of society, in having people secure in the knowledge that no one
is enjoying obscenity, is insufficient as long as the interest in eliminating
commercial exploitation in the city has been satisfied.
Thus, under one reading of the interests protected by obscenity
legislation-commercial exploitation-it might be possible to view obscenity
in the privacy of the home by turning on the cable. But not only is this
reading premised on a possibly limited reading of the interests asserted in
Slaton, it also carries the implicit premise of a right to receive.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 58 (1973).
Id. at 63.
Id.
Id. at 59 (1973), quoting Bickel, supra note 158, at 25-26.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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The Court has rejected the idea that Stanley granted a consenting adult a
right to receive pornography, either by purchase in the market, 6 through
the mails, 167 or by private importation. 16s Prohibiting purchase in the
marketplace falls precisely within the Slaton concern for commercial exploitation. Forbidding a consenting adult from receiving obscenity through the
mails begins to have an attenuated relationship with commercial exploitation,
although preventing obscenity from entering the stream of commerce is
broad enough to make the prohibition plausible and thus keep the commercial exploitation rationale alive. 160 But when private importation by a citizen
for his own personal use is considered, talk about commercial exploitation
enters the world of 1984 unless we now view our missionary role as cleaning
up commercial exploitation the world over. Not surprisingly, in the private
importation case the Court did not mention any governmental interests
justifying the prohibition. 170
Slaton may have offered the state's justifications, but prohibitions can go
beyond them. Thus in the case of a cable viewer, any obscene program
would have to be made somewhere, be cablecast from somewhere, and be
carried locally. Seemingly, some government would have an interest in prohibiting each part of the necessary transaction except viewing. Any interstate cablecasting would run afoul of the current FCC regulation, 17 and any reasoning that prohibits the interstate transportation of obscene material for personal
use is certainly sufficient to sustain the regulation. Moreover, it is hardly an
extension of that reasoning to allow local prosecution, applying local stand7
ards, 72 of any intrastate transmission. .
Just before he died, Justice Black wrote of the beginnings of Stanley's
emasculation: "perhaps in the future that case will be recognized as good
law only when a man writes salacious books in his attic, prints them in his
166. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
167. See United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971); cf. United States v. Orito, 413
U.S. 139 (1973) (common carrier).
168. See United States v. 12 200-Foot Reels of Super 8 mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123
(1973).
169. See United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 143 (1973).
170. See 'United States v. 12 200-Foot Reels of Super 8 mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123
(1973).
171. 47 C.F.R. § 76-215 (1975).
172. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30-34 (1973). The initial application of
"local" standards. will come from the local cable system which will have to make some
judgments when it receives an out-of-state transmission about whether that program will
be acceptable under the prevailing local standards.
173. For example, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals has affirmed an injunction
against the furnishing of obscene movies via closed circuit TV to motel patrons in their
rooms. Locke v. Texas,'516 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
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basement, and reads them in his living room. '174 Although citations to
Justice Black in the obscenity area are notably absent in current majority
opinions, this sentence surely deserves favorable treatment. It perfectly states
the current status of the right protected by Stanley.
III.

A PROGNOSIS

FOR THE FUTURE OF CABLE AND OBSCENITY

This survey of the law of obscenity and indecency as it may relate to the
future development of cable television offers some bright prospects as well as
some constraining ones. On balance, I believe that the former significantly
overshadow the latter.
Over-the-air broadcasting has always functioned under significant constraints, whether they be fears that the FCC would strongly oppose certain
types of programming or the pressures of reaching the appropriate audience
for the purposes of maximizing advertising revenues. Cable may well be free
from the latter restraint, and the foregoing analysis leads to the simple
conclusion that it is certainly free of the former. Programming that has been
deemed offensive-and therefore sanctionable-when offered over the
seemingly scarce airways will be immune from such legal impositions when
cablecast. No theory of regulation, from the fear of media power to special
concern for children to the solicitude for a quasi-captive audience, that treats
cable differently from the nonbroadcast media can withstand scrutiny. Thus
cable, with its unfulfilled promise of abundance, will receive the legal
treatment of a medium of abundance.
As applied to indecent programs-whatever this term may mean-this
freedom will mean that the viewer need not watch or listen. The only
remedy will be self-help. Even a program like the one involved in Sonderling
probably would be immune when the problems of children are removed. If
there were no pandering, the issue would be free from doubt. Talk shows
may be as frank as they wish, given that the visual part of obscenity is what
separates films from books.
As applied to filmed obscene programs, this freedom will mean that the
determination of obscenity will follow the same substantive and procedural
standards as those intended for a theater; nothing less will suffice. A
tremendous leap in available viewing material for the home will occur,
simply because of the new freedom from legal constraints imposed on the
broadcast media.
Even the negative side of the picture is not totally bleak. Cable will be
forced to operate under the same general laws as the remainder of the
174. United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 382 (1971)
dissenting).

(Black, J.,
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nonbroadcast media. The combination of abundance and home viewing is
simply not sufficient to remove cable television from the general purview of
the obscenity laws, no matter how attenuated their purposes may seem.
Possibly at some future date the Supreme Court will conclude that a
consenting adult's desire for obscene materials raises a sufficient interest
under the first amendment or under the substantive due process privacy right
of sexual gratification to overcome the state's current speculative interest in
regulation. At that time cable will indeed be a medium of abundance for all
groups of Americans.

